A Analysis of Swinburne's Protection of Substance Dualism
a) Swinburne’s defense of element dualism proceeds in two phases. First, he surmises an external observer’s understanding of the events occurring to individuals’ “bodies and their parts” wouldn't normally be enough to create reasoned arguments concerning “what goes on to those persons who are (presently)” living and sapient humans (Swinburne 146). Consequently, Swinburne assumes that it's possible to regard body and mind as individual elements of human essence.
The following example can be advanced by Swinburne to get his argument. He invites his reader to guess that a major procedure has been performed on a person in order that his/her brain or a component thereof is transplanted to some other person’s skull. If it had been possible to remove among the brain’s hemispheres and transplant it to the “living body that the brain has simply been removed”, two separate individuals that might be allegedly identical within their “apparent memory and persona” would emerge (Swinburne 147). However, these two individuals can't be completely identical to one another, as they would will have separate mental lives. Therefore, it may well not be possible to predict with certainty the near future behavior of the brand new replicated person in question, resulting in the conclusion that the foundation of uncertainty would not get strictly physical in material. So the existence of some form of immaterial “soul-stuff”, distinct from brain matter, ought to be construed to person’s continuing existence and mental claims’ alterations.
While Swinburne’s argument could be superficially convincing, it does not address the problem of the forming of new mental says in the individual that is hypothetically born from a transplanted hemisphere. It could appear that Swinburne does not account